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ABSTRACT
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are known to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks.
Currently, there is no clear insight into how slight perturbations cause such a
large difference in classification results and how we can design a more robust
model architecture. In this work, we propose a novel interpretability method,
InterpretGAN, to generate explanations for features used for classification in latent
variables. Interpreting the classification process of adversarial examples exposes
how adversarial perturbations influence features layer by layer as well as which
features are modified by perturbations. Moreover, we design the first diagnostic
method to quantify the vulnerability contributed by each layer, which can be used
to identify vulnerable parts of model architectures. The diagnostic results show
that the layers introducing more information loss tend to be more vulnerable than
other layers. Based on the findings, our evaluation results on MNIST and CIFAR10
datasets suggest that average pooling layers, with lower information loss, are more
robust than max pooling layers for the network architectures studied in this paper.
1 Introduction
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have been found to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks [1]. Even
slight imperceptible perturbations can lead to model misclassification. To mitigate adversarial attacks,
various types of defense methods [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] are proposed. Besides building defense
methods, recent research also tries to interpret the reason behind the adversarial attack. Ilyas et
al. [10] showed that DNNs tend to use non-robust features for classification, rather than robust
features. Another work [11] applied network dissection [12] to interpret adversarial examples.
However, there is no clear understanding of the reason behind the vulnerability to adversarial attacks.
Since latent variables in DNNs are usually uninterpretable, it is difficult to explain how adversarial
perturbations influence features in latent variables and result in final misclassification.
If features influenced by perturbations can be translated to natural image space, we can understand
which features are influenced in latent variables. To achieve this goal, we propose a novel inter-
pretability method, InterpretGAN, that can generate explanations for features relevant to classification
in latent variables. In InterpretGAN, we apply a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) to train
the explanation generator so that generated explanations follow a training data distribution and are
interpretable. In order for explanations to contain the necessary features used for classification,
we introduce an interpretability term for GAN training that ensures mutual information between
explanations and classification results. Whenever adversarial perturbations distort features used for
classification, InterpretGAN can reflect those changes in the explanations.
We interpret the classification process of models trained on MNIST [13] and CelebFaces [14] (with
gender as the label) datasets and use InterpretGAN to generate explanations for each layer of the two
models. Based on generated explanations, we discover several interesting findings. For classification
of natural images, we find that as latent variables are processed layer by layer, features irrelevant
to classification (e.g., hat for gender classification) are filtered out. Furthermore, when adversarial
examples are fed into the models, we notice that, rather than changing features directly in the
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input, adversarial perturbations influence latent variables gradually layer by layer, and meaningless
perturbations in the input cause semantic changes in latent variables. For the CelebFaces model,
perturbations change different kinds of features in different layers. These explanations and findings
can help researchers further understand the reason behind adversarial attacks.
A crucial problem of interpretability research is determining how to use interpretability results to
improve model performance. Bhatt et al. [15] conducted a survey showing that the largest demand
for interpretability is to diagnose the model and to improve model performance. In Section 5, based
on InterpretGAN, we propose the first diagnostic method that can quantify the vulnerability of each
layer to help diagnose the problem of models layer by layer. This diagnostic method can be used for
identifying vulnerable layers of model architectures and can provide insights to researchers towards
designing more robust model architectures or adding additional regularizers to improve robustness of
these layers. We diagnose an MNIST model with the proposed method and find layers causing more
information loss tend to be more vulnerable than other layers. Based on the diagnostic results, we
propose using average pooling layers that introduce less information loss than max pooling layers to
improve the robustness. Our evaluation results show that average pooling layers are more robust than
max pooling layers on MNIST and CIFAR10 [16] datasets.
We summarize our contributions in this work as follows:
• We propose a novel interpretability method, InterpretGAN, that generates explanations
based on features relevant to classification in latent variables layer by layer. The generated
explanations show how and what features in latent variables are influenced by adversarial
perturbations layer by layer.
• To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to propose a diagnostic method that
quantifies the vulnerability contributed by each layer. This diagnostic method can help
identify problems in model architectures with respect to robustness and can provide insights
to researchers for building more robust models.
• Based on the insights offered by diagnostic results, the layers that introduce more information
loss can be more vulnerable than other layers. We therefore conduct a study on the robustness
of pooling layers. The evaluation results show that average pooling layers have better
robustness compared to max pooling layers on both MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Adversarial Examples and Adversarial Training
Szegedy et al. [1] showed that small adversarial perturbations δ on an input x, which lead to a
misclassification by deep neural networks, can be found by solving the following:
δ = argmax
δ∈S
L(f(x+ δ), y),
where S is the allowed perturbation space, L is the loss function, f is the classification model, and y is
the ground truth label. Defending against adversarial attacks is an active research area [2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 17],
and adversarial training [6], which formulates training as a game between a classification model and
adversarial attacks, is one of the most effective defense methods. To get clues on how to design a
more robust model architecture for adversarial training, we propose a model architecture diagnostic
method to quantify the vulnerability contributed by each layer in Section 5.
2.2 Generative Adversarial Network
GAN was introduced in [18] as a framework for training generative models. GAN has a generator and
a discriminator network. The generator G takes a latent variable z ∼ pz following a prior distribution,
and its output G(z) matches the real data distribution pdata. G is trained against an adversarial
discriminator D that tries to distinguish G(z) from the data distribution pdata. The min-max game of
GAN training can be formalized by:
min
G
max
D
V (D,G) = Ex∼pdata [logD(x)] + Ez∼pz [log(1−D(G(z)))]. (1)
2
Chen et al. [19] found that it is possible to generate images with certain properties by adding
corresponding regularizers in the loss function. In this work, we use GAN to train a generator that
generates explanations that contain the necessary information of features used for classification in
latent variables.
3 Methodology: InterpretGAN
An intriguing property of adversarial examples is that slight perturbations in input space can lead
to large changes in output labels. Since latent variables of DNNs are usually uninterpretable, it is
difficult to figure out how adversarial perturbations influence features in latent variables. If we can
invert modified features back to images, we can understand how adversarial perturbations influence
these features. To achieve this goal, we propose a novel interpretability method, InterpretGAN, that
generates explanations for latent variables based on features relevant to classification.
The proposed InterpretGAN method uses GAN to train an explanation generator per layer that
generates explanations for relevant features in that layer to images following distribution pdata. For a
classification model f and a latent variable l of a layer, we denote the composition of layers before
l as fpre and composition of layers after l as fpost, i.e. , f = fpost ◦ fpre, and l = fpre(x). As
shown in Figure 1, we treat the visual explanation of latent variable l as a generative process with
interpretability regularization. Instead of reconstructing original images from latent variables [20, 21],
InterpretGAN generates explanations that only contain necessary features relevant to the classification.
Generated explanations are thus expected to differ from the original images since unnecessary features
may be discarded.
To sum up, explanation xˆ needs to satisfy two properties: 1) xˆ should follow the data distribution
pdata to help guarantee that it is interpretable, and 2) xˆ captures the necessary information in the
latent variables used for classification.
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Figure 1: The network G generates explana-
tions xˆ based on features relevant to classifi-
cation in latent variable l, and xˆ follows data
distribution pdata.
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Figure 2: Training framework of InterpretGAN.
Compression network C can reduce the dimen-
sion of latent variables. LI(G) is the inter-
pretability term.
Since we use GAN to train network G, the generated explanations naturally satisfy the first prop-
erty [18]. For the second property, we add an interpretability term in the min-max game of GAN
(Eq. 2). The objective of the interpretability term is for the generated explanation xˆ to contain a high
mutual information with the classification result f(x), which is I(xˆ, f(x)). The higher the value of
I(xˆ, f(x)), the more information used for classification is contained in xˆ.
Therefore, to train InterpretGAN, we formalize the min-max game for our GAN training as the
following, including a mutual information term as compared to equation 1:
min
G
max
D
VI(D,G) = V (D,G)− λI(xˆ, f(x))
= V (D,G)− λI(G(l), f(x)),
where V (D,G) = Ex∼pdata [logD(x)] + El∼pl [log(1−D(G(l)))].
(2)
3
The calculation of the interpretability term I(G(l), f(x)) is intractable during training, but we can
maximize the variational lower bound for I(G(l), f(x)) as a surrogate1:
I(G(l), f(x)) = I(xˆ, y) = H(y)−H(y|xˆ)
≥
∫
xˆ
p(xˆ)
∫
y
p(y|xˆ) log p(yˆ|xˆ)dydxˆ+H(y)
= Exˆ∼G(l),y∼f(x)[log p(yˆ|xˆ)] +H(y) , LI(G),
(3)
where y is f(x), and yˆ is f(xˆ). So the final optimization problem becomes:
min
G
max
D
VI(D,G) = V (D,G)− λLI(G). (4)
The training framework of our model is illustrated in Figure 2. In practice, since some latent variables
have a large dimension, we adopt an extra compression network C between the latent variables and
the generative model. C compresses the latent variables and controls the dimension of input for the
generative model, which causes GAN training converge more efficiently.
In the following two sections, we divide our evaluation into two parts. In Section 4, InterpretGAN
is used to explain how models classify natural images and adversarial images, and how adversarial
perturbations lead to misclassification. In Section 5, a diagnostic method is designed based on
InterpretGAN to quantify the vulnerability of each layer in a model.
4 Visual Explanation of Latent Variables for Classification
In this section, we apply our method to interpret classification models trained with two datasets:
MNIST [13] and CelebFaces [14] with gender as the label. For MNIST, we resize all images to
32× 32 for the convenience of GAN training and use a widely used model architecture in adversarial
training research [6, 7, 17, 22, 9]. We use VGG16 [23] for the CelebFaces classification, and the
generative models are trained with progressive GAN [24]. For MNIST, we interpret outputs for all
convolutional and fully connected layers. For CelebFaces, we interpret outputs of all convolutional
blocks and fully connected layers.
The results of interpreting the classification process of natural images and adversarial examples for
the naturally trained models are presented in Section 4.1. Due to space limits, additional explanation
results and detailed experiment configuration can be found in the supplementary material.
4.1 Interpreting Classification Process
We interpret two models naturally trained with MNIST and CelebFaces datasets and compare the ex-
planation results of our method to other interpretability methods (DeepLIFT [25], saliency maps [26],
input×gradient [27], integrated gradient [28], and occlusion [29]), which explain the relation between
classification results and features. To investigate how adversarial perturbations influence features
in the MNIST dataset, we use PGD-40 (l∞,  = 0.3) [30] and PGD-20 (l∞,  = 2/255) untargeted
attacks to generate adversarial examples for MNIST and CelebFaces models. Figures 3 and 5 show
the generated explanations for MNIST model and CelebFaces model, respectively.
Classification of Natural Images. The first and third rows in Figures 3 and 5 present the expla-
nations of natural image classification. Since the generated explanations are regularized with the
interpretability term in Eq. 2, we find that the explanations for natural images are consistent with the
classification results, but not identical to the inputs2. It is also observed that the model tries to only
keep necessary features used for classification and tends to drop irrelevant features in latent variables.
As shown in Figure 4, for a woman with a hat and a man with a microphone, the irrelevant features
(hat and microphone) are gradually removed or transformed layer by layer.
Classification of Adversarial Examples. When we feed adversarial examples into the models, the
explanations are quite different. The second and fourth rows in Figures 3 and 5 show the explanations
1The derivation process can be found in the supplementary material.
2In FC layers, dimensions of latent variables are largely compressed, and features lose detailed information,
which makes it harder for G to invert details and causes the large changes in FC layers.
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Figure 3: Explanations of classifications on natural images and corresponding adversarial images on
the MNIST dataset. Explanations of adversarial examples are changed gradually through layers. Other
interpretability methods can show the importance of pixels for classification of the natural image, but
the explanation for the adversarial examples can’t explain the reason behind misclassification.
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Figure 4: Generated explanations with features irrelevant to gender classification. The woman’s hat
in the first row is transformed into her hair during classification. The microphone in the second row
is filtered in the first two convolutional blocks and the blocked face is completed by the model.
for corresponding adversarial examples. One interesting finding we notice for both models is that,
rather than changing features directly in adversarial examples, adversarial perturbations influence
latent variables gradually layer by layer: the deeper the layer is, the closer the explanation is to
the misclassified label. However, we cannot find such difference in explanations generated by other
baseline methods. We also find that adversarial perturbations influence features in latent variables in
different ways for the MNIST and CelebFaces models.
For the MNIST model, although adversarial perturbations only change pixel values in the input
images, explanations show that perturbations actually also modify features related to pixel position in
latent variables. Figure 3 shows that the process of misclassification of adversarial "0" and "7". In
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Figure 5: Explanations generated by our method and other baseline methods. InterpretGAN can
illustrate which features are modified by adversarial perturbations. In shallower layers, local facial
features are modified and, in deeper layers, backgrounds and hair are modified. Other interpretability
methods have similar results to explanations on the MNIST dataset.
addition to pixel values, pixel positions are also gradually changed so that perturbations can reuse
these pixels to form new features for misclassified labels. The explanation "6" for adversarial "0"
reuses most parts of original "0", and the explanation "3" for adversarial "7" is the curved version of
the original "7".
When we perform the untargeted attack on MNIST, we find that adversarial examples with the
same ground truth label are more likely to be misclassified as a certain label. For example, with
the untargeted attack, 39.3% adversarial "0"s are misclassified as "6", and 39.5% adversarial "7"s
are misclassified as "3".3 We think the reason is that it is easier for perturbations to spatially move
original pixels to form features for the misclassified labels compared to only changing pixels values.
The CelebFaces dataset shows that adversarial perturbations influence different types of features in
different layers: local features (e.g., nose, eyes, mouth, and beard) are more likely to be changed in
shallower layers, and global features (e.g., hair and background) tend to be changed in deeper layers.
As shown in Figure 5, when an adversarial "female" is fed into the model, the perturbations change
eyes and nose first and then add a beard to the face. At a latter stage, the long blond hair is changed to
short black hair. For the adversarial examples in the fourth line, eyes, lip, and make-up are changed
in the shallower layers. Hair becomes longer in the explanations of Conv Block4 and Conv Block5.
5 Diagnosing Model Architecture
A crucial need for interpretability methods is how to take advantage of interpretability results to
improve model performance [15]. What we have presented so far provides visual explanations for
adversarial attacks, but not a diagnostic procedure to improve the model. In this section, we design a
novel diagnostic method that can quantify the vulnerability contributed by each layer to adversarial
3More results can be found in the supplementary material.
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attacks. We accomplish that by feeding the generated explanations back into the classification model
and developing a metric to measure vulnerability contributed by each layer, as outlined next.
5.1 Quantifying Vulnerability for Layers
For a layer whose output is latent variable l (i.e. , l = fpre(x), f = fpost ◦ fpre) and its generated
explanation xˆ = G(C(fpre(x))), since features of xˆ are only influenced by perturbations related
to fpre and xˆ follows the natural data distribution pdata, perturbations related to fpost are filtered
out in xˆ. If we feed xˆ back to the classification model f , we can measure how much adversarial
perturbations related to fpre change the classification result.
To evaluate the vulnerability of each layer against an adversarial datasetD∗, we calculate the accuracy
Acci of the generated explanation xˆ for the ith layer and introduce a metric defined as follows:
the vulnerability V uli of the ith layer is the accuracy drop as compared to the previous layer.
Mathematically, it is formulated as:
V uli =
{
1−Acci i = 1
Acci−1 −Acci i > 1
Acci = E(x∗,y)∈D∗ [1{true}(f(xˆi) = y)]
xˆi = G(C(fprei(x
∗))),
(5)
where 1 is the indicator function, and fprei is the composition of layers until the ith layer.
5.2 Example: Diagnosis of MNIST Models
Layers Conv1 Conv2 Conv3 Conv4 FC1 FC2 FC3
Naturally
Trained
Acci 52.6% 26.3% 21.6% 9.9% 4.3% 3.0% 3.5%
V uli 47.4% 26.3% 4.7% 11.7% 5.6% 1.3% −0.5%
Adversarially
Trained
Acci 95.1% 94.0% 93.9% 92.6% 90.1% 90.0% 89.5%
V uli 4.9% 1.1% 0.1% 1.3% 2.5% 0.1% 0.5%
Table 1: Accuracy on InterpretGAN-generated images and the vulnerability of each layer for naturally-
and adversarially-trained MNIST models. Red numbers indicate large accuracy drop (vulnerability).
Conv1
Conv2
M
axpool
Conv3
Conv4
M
axpool
FC1
FC2
FC3! "
Figure 6: Architecture of the model used for MNIST classification. Red lines indicate layers with
large accuracy drop (vulnerability) on generated images.
We use the proposed method to quantify the vulnerability of MNIST model architecture used in
Section 4 and then quantify the vulnerability for a naturally trained model and an adversarially trained
model. We perform PGD-40 l∞( = 0.3) attack on a test set to obtain D∗, and we use ATTA-1 [9] to
adversarially train the models.
Table 1 shows the diagnostic results. For both models, accuracy drops in almost all layers, which
is consistent to our finding that perturbations influence latent variables gradually through layers4.
Specifically, we find that four layers (Conv1, Conv2, Conv4, and FC1) are more vulnerable than other
layers. To study the reason behind these vulnerable layers, we locate them in the model architecture
shown in Figure 6. For Conv1 (Conv layer after image) and FC1 (FC layer after Conv layer), we think
4The naturally trained model has a negative vulnerability in layer FC3. This fluctuation is believed to be
caused by that output distribution of model G just approximates pdata rather than being identical to pdata.
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the reason behind high vulnerability is that these two layers change the format of latent variables,
which causes a higher information loss. Conv2 and Conv4 contain max pooling layers that down-
sample latent features. The pooling layers in the MNIST model use 2×2 filter and 2×2 stride, which
drops 75% of latent variables during classification. The higher information loss can be the cause for
the vulnerability of these layers. We compare the difference of max pooling indices (positions of
the maximum value) between natural images and adversarial examples and find that, with PGD-40
(l∞,  = 0.3) attack, 40.9% and 18.1% max pooling indices change in the first and second pooling
layers, respectively, which means that some important features in maximum variables used for natural
classification are dropped. Besides changing the value of features, adversarial perturbations also drop
important features in max pooling layers, likely leading to higher vulnerability of these layers.
PGD-40 PGD-100 M-PGD-40 FGSM
Max Pooling 89.33% 81.98% 89.76% 95.62%
Avg Pooling 91.56% 87.48% 92.09% 95.72%
Table 2: Comparison of robustness between max pooling model and average pooling model on the
MNIST. Model with average pooling layers show better robustness.
PGD-20 PGD-100 M-PGD-20 FGSM
VGG16 Max Pooling 46.97% 45.69% 47.06% 50.46%Avg Pooling 48.25% 47.09% 48.91% 51.64%
WideResNet Max pooling 53.08% 51.65% 53.94% 57.63%Avg pooling 54.68% 52.59% 55.47% 59.92%
Table 3: With average pooling layers, CIFAR10 models show better robustness under different
adversarial attacks.
To mitigate the information loss in the max pooling layer, we propose using average pooling instead
of max pooling. Compared to max pooling, average pooling uses all features to calculate outputs,
which can retain more information during down-sampling. We adversarially retrain the MNIST
model with average pooling layers and present a comparison of robustness under different attacks
in Table 2. The results show that model robustness can be improved by simply replacing the max
pooling layer with the average pooling layer. We also evaluate this experiment on the CIFAR10
dataset with VGG16 [23] and WideResNet [31]. The evaluation results shown in Table 3 also indicate
that the average pooling layer tends to be more robust than the max pooling layer in these networks.
6 Related Work
Interpretability methods. Lots of efforts have tried understanding how DNNs classify images.
Some works [32] study the relation between classification results and input features and most of
the works [27, 28, 29] focus on estimating the importance (e.g., Shapley Value) of pixels in images.
Others [20, 21, 33] also try to invert latent features back to the image space, but unlike our work,
which generates explanation only based on relevant features used for classification, these works focus
on reconstructing complete input images from all features encoded in latent variables. Similar to our
work, there are also some recent research [34, 35, 36] designing interpretability methods based on
generative models. The generative models generate explanations to determine which features need to
be changed in input to change the confidence of classification. Singla et al. [34] also uses this method
to generate saliency maps for input images. Unlike our work, none of the previous works study how
adversarial perturbations influence features in latent variables.
Insights for building robust models. The reasons behind the existence of adversarial examples
and how to build more robust models are still open questions. Goodfellow et al. [37, 38] suggested
the cause of adversarial examples is the linear nature of layers in neural networks with sufficient
dimensionality. Ilyas et al. [10] found that neural networks tend to use non-robust features for
classification rather than robust features. Other works [39, 40] studied why adversarially trained
models are more robust than naturally trained models. Xu et al. [11] applied network dissection [12]
to interpret adversarial examples. Unlike previous research, in this work, we interpret adversarial
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examples from a new perspective, which produce additional insights for researchers to understand
adversarial attacks.
7 Conclusion
In this work, we propose a novel interpretability method, as well as the first diagnostic method that
can quantify the vulnerability contributed by each layer against adversarial attacks. By factoring in
the mutual information between generated images and classification results, InterpretGAN generates
explanations containing relevant features used for classification in latent variables at each layer. The
generated explanations show how and what features are influenced by adversarial perturbations. We
also propose a new vulnerability metric that can be computed using InterpretGAN to provide insights
to identify vulnerable parts of models against adversarial attacks. Based on the diagnostic results,
we study the relationship between robustness and model architectures. Specifically, we find that, to
design a robust model, average pooling layers can be a more reliable than max pooling layers.
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A Overview
This supplementary material provides detailed configuration information of our derivation and experiments.
Section B includes a detailed derivation process of the variational lower bound for the mutual information.
Section C describes the detailed model architecture and experimental setup. Section D presents additional
examples of explanations.
B Derivation of Variational Lower Bound of Interpretability Term
The derivation for Equation 3 of the paper is shown below in further detail.
To show (Eq. 3):
I(G(l), f(x)) = I(xˆ, y) = H(y)−H(y|xˆ)
≥
∫
xˆ
p(xˆ)
∫
y
p(y|xˆ) log p(yˆ|xˆ)dydxˆ+H(y)
= Exˆ∼G(l),y∼f(x)[log p(yˆ|xˆ)] +H(y) , LI(G)
Derivation:
I(G(l), f(x)) = I(xˆ, y) = H(y)−H(y|xˆ)
=
∫
xˆ
∫
y
p(y, xˆ) log p(y|xˆ)dydxˆ+H(y)
=
∫
xˆ
p(xˆ)
∫
y
p(y|xˆ) log p(y|xˆ)dydxˆ+H(y)
=
∫
xˆ
p(xˆ)
∫
y
(p(y|xˆ) log p(y|xˆ)
p(yˆ|xˆ) + p(y|xˆ) log p(yˆ|xˆ))dydxˆ+H(y)
=
∫
xˆ
p(xˆ)
∫
y
(DKL(p(y|xˆ)||p(yˆ|xˆ)) + p(y|xˆ) log p(yˆ|xˆ))dydxˆ+H(y)
≥
∫
xˆ
p(xˆ)
∫
y
p(y|xˆ) log p(yˆ|xˆ)dydxˆ+H(y)
=
∫
xˆ
∫
y
p(y, xˆ) log p(yˆ|xˆ)dydxˆ+H(y)
= Exˆ∼G(l),y∼f(x)[log p(yˆ|xˆ)] +H(y) , LI(G),
where DKL is the Kullback–Leibler divergence and H(x) is the entropy of random variable x.
C Model Architecture and Experiment Setup
In this section, we provide additional details on the implementation, model architecture, and hyper-parameters
used in this work. For the baseline methods used in Section 4, we use Captum [41] to generate explanations.
Classification models. For the MNIST dataset, we use the same model architecture as used in [6, 7, 22],
which has four convolutional layers and three fully-connected layers. The naturally trained model is trained
for 10 epochs with a 0.01 learning rate in the first 5 epochs and a 0.001 learning rate in the last 5 epochs. For
the CelebFaces dataset, we use VGG16 [23] for gender classification. The naturally trained model is trained
for 7 epochs with a 0.001 learning rate. In Section 5, for the CIFAR10 dataset, we use VGG16 [23] and
Wide-Resnet-34-10 [31] as the model architecture.
Adversarial attack and adversarial training. For generating adversarial examples, we perform PGD-40
(l∞,  = 0.3) [30] attack on the MNIST dataset, PGD-20 (l∞,  = 2/255) attack on the CelebFaces dataset,
and PGD-20 (l∞,  = 8/255) attack on the CIFAR10 dataset. For adversarial training used in Section 5, we
use ATTA-1 [9] with TRADES loss (β = 6)[7] (and with recommended hyperparameters from [7]) to train the
model.
Generative models. We use progressive GAN [24] to train the generative models for the MNIST [13] and the
CelebFaces [14] datasets. For latent variables in different layers, we use the same architecture for explanation
generators. Different compression networks were used to connect latent variables and explanation generators,
as described in Tables 4 and 5 for MNIST and CelebFaces, respectively. We set λ = 1 for all InterpretGAN
training.
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For the explanation generators of the MNIST dataset, we resize the image to 32 for the convenience of
progressive GAN training. Explanation generators have 4 scales, and each scale has 2 convolutional layers
and are connected with an up-sample layer. The outputs of each scale are 4× 4, 8× 8, 16× 16, and 32× 32.
The discriminators have an inversed architecture, but up-sample layers are replaced by down-sample layers.
For the first three scales, each scale is trained for 6 epochs, and the last (fourth) scale is trained for another 12
epochs. All epochs use a 0.001 learning rate. Our implementation of progressive GAN for MNIST is based on
https://github.com/jeromerony/Progressive_Growing_of_GANs-PyTorch.
For the explanation generators of the CelebFaces dataset, as in progressive GAN [24], we resize the image to
128× 128. Explanation generators have 6 scales, and each scale has 2 convolutional layers and is connected
with an up-sample layer. The outputs of each scale are 4× 4, 8× 8, 16× 16, 32× 32, 64× 64, and 128× 128.
The discriminators have an inversed architecture but with up-sample layers replaced by down-sample layers.
Our implementation of progressive GAN is based on https://github.com/facebookresearch/pytorch_
GAN_zoo. The first scale is trained for 48, 000 iterations. For the other 5 scales, each scale is trained for 96, 000
iterations.
Layers Compression Network Architecture
Conv1 3× 3 Conv, 64→ AvgPooling→ 3× 3 Conv, 128→AvgPooling→ 3× 3 Conv, 256→ AvgPooling→ FC
Conv2 3× 3 Conv, 64→ AvgPooling→
3× 3 Conv, 128→ AvgPooling→ FC
Conv3 3× 3 Conv, 128→ AvgPooling→
3× 3 Conv, 256→ AvgPooling→ FC
Conv4 FC
FC1 FC
FC2 FC
FC3 FC
Table 4: Compression network archtectures for different layers of the MNIST model.
Layers Compression Network Architecture
Conv Block1
3× 3 Conv, 128→ AvgPooling→ 3× 3 Conv, 256→
AvgPooling→ 3× 3 Conv, 512→ AvgPooling→
3× 3 Conv, 512→ AvgPooling
Conv Block2 3× 3 Conv, 256→ AvgPooling→ 3× 3 Conv, 512→AvgPooling→ 3× 3 Conv, 512→ AvgPooling
Conv Block3 3× 3 Conv, 512→ AvgPooling→
3× 3 Conv, 512→ AvgPooling
Conv Block4 3× 3 Conv, 512→ AvgPooling
Conv Block5 3× 3 Conv, 512
FC1 FC
FC2 FC
FC3 FC
Table 5: Compression network archtectures for different layers of the CelebFaces model.
D Additional Experiment Results
In this section, we present additional examples and results for Section 4 in the paper. Figure 7 shows the
distribution of misclassified labels of the MNIST dataset under an untargeted attack. As discussed in Section 4.1
in the paper, we find that, under an untargeted attack, images with different ground truth labels tend to be
misclassified as different labels. A possible reason is that, given an image with a ground truth label, it is easier
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for perturbations to change the image to a similar image with a misclassified label by changing the position
features of some pixels, while reusing some of the original pixels. We also present more explanation examples
of classification on natural images and adversarial images in Figures 4, 8, 9, and 11.
Figure 7: The distribution of misclassified labels: the different ground truth labels tend to be
misclassified as different labels.
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Conv1 Conv2
Conv3 Conv4 FC1
FC3 (Probability)FC2
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Explanation for Each Layer
Figure 8: Explanations for randomly selected natural images from the test dataset.
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Figure 9: Explanations for adversarial images generated by PGD-40 for images in Figure 8.
15
Conv Block1 Conv Block2
FC2FC1
Natural Input
Explanation for Each Layer
Conv Block3 Conv Block4 Conv Block5
FC3 (Probability)
Figure 10: Explanations for randomly selected natural images from the test dataset.
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Figure 11: Explanations for adversarial images generated by PGD-40 for images in Figure 10.
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